[topic] has become a widely debated issue in today's world. While some individuals strongly support it, others completely oppose its significance. In my opinion, [topic] have more positive effects than negative ones globally. To begin with, there are several reasons to support this belief. The most notable advantage is that [pos]. For example, a study conducted by the University of Sydney highlights that [pos]. Additionally, [pos] is another compelling reason. This ensures [pos]. On the contrary, critics argue that [topic] also have notable drawbacks. One of the most significant disadvantages is [neg]. For instance, research conducted by the University of New York reveals that [neg]. Furthermore, [neg] may also create challenges, such as [neg]. In conclusion, while [topic] may have certain negative aspects, the benefits far outweigh the drawbacks. Therefore, it is crucial to promote the effective use of [topic] while minimising its misuse. By doing so, [topic] can become a more constructive and beneficial part of our lives.
On the contrary, critics argue that [topic] also have notable drawbacks. One of the most significant disadvantages is [neg]. For instance, research conducted by the University of New York reveals that [neg]. Furthermore, [neg] may also create challenges, such as [neg].
The Quick Brown Fox Jumps Over The Lazy Dog.
the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog.
[topic] has become a widely debated issue in today's world. While some individuals strongly support it, others completely oppose its significance. In my opinion, [topic] have more positive effects than negative ones globally.
In conclusion, while [topic] may have certain negative aspects, the benefits far outweigh the drawbacks. Therefore, it is crucial to promote the effective use of [topic] while minimising its misuse. By doing so, [topic] can become a more constructive and beneficial part of our lives.
Conspiracy requires (1) an agreement, (2) the defendant’s intent to commit a particular crime; and (3) in most jurisdictions, an overt act in furtherance of that agreement.
The Rule of Consistency: Under common law, if all other coconspirators were acquitted, the one remaining alleged coconspirator must also be acquitted. Not all jurisdictions still follow this rule. For example, “if substantial evidence supports a jury verdict as to one defendant, that verdict may stand despite an apparently inconsistent verdict as to another defendant.” People v. Palmer.
The Agreement: An agreement between at least two persons who have at least a tacit understanding of the object of the conspiracy.
The bilateral approach: conspiracy requires an agreement between at least two people who actually have a genuine criminal intent to accomplish an illegal objective. There can be no indictable conspiracy with a government informer who secretly intends to frustrate the conspiracy. Sears v. U.S.
The unilateral approach (MPC approach): the person can be guilty of conspiracy even if others in the conspiracy feign agreement.
The government need only demonstrate a tacit understanding between the conspirators. Can be inferred from circumstantial evidence; does not require direct evidence.
Each conspirator can be liable without agreeing to every illegal act but must understand the scheme’s essential nature. A condition imposed by the conspirators upon the carrying out of a conspiracy does not negate the conspiracy. U.S. v. Palmer.
Conspiracy requires that the parties have the purpose to achieve a common unlawful objective.
Conspiracy requires proof of two distinct intents: (1) the defendant intended to participate in the conspiracy, and (2) the defendant intended that the conspiracy’s unlawful object be achieved.
Suppliers of Goods or Services Used to Commit the Crime: Supplier’s purpose to achieve a common unlawful objective with a criminal purchaser exists if the supplier (1) knew of the criminal use to which the goods or services are to be used; and (2) intended to further that criminal use, considering direct or circumstantial evidence
Circumstantial evidence of supplier’s intent: supplier sold supplies at an inflated price, that no legitimate use for the supplies exists, or a significant percentage of the supplier’s business is with the purchaser.
Duration of a Conspiracy: Conspiracy ends when the conspirators have accomplished the conspiracy’s goal or abandoned the conspiracy.
A person may become a coconspirator at any time between the formation and termination of the conspiracy.
Withdrawal from Conspiracy: If a defendant withdraws from the conspiracy, they are only liable for events occurred while participating.
Establishing withdrawal: defendant must prove that they (1) stopped participating in the conspiracy, (2) performed some affirmative act that was inconsistent with the conspiracy’s goals, (3) communicated their withdrawal to the other conspirators.
Scope of Conspiracy: In conspiracies with numerous participants, a person is a coconspirator only with those other participants that have a common interest.
Chain Conspiracy: In a chain conspiracy, the conspirators are involved in successive organizational cooperation.
Hub and Spoke Conspiracy
A single person (the “hub”) operates individually with persons or groups operating independently (the “spokes”).
The Pinkerton Doctrine (Accessory Liability for Coconspirators): A conspirator may be held liable for criminal offenses committed by a coconspirator that are within the scope of the conspiracy, are in furtherance of it, and are reasonably foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy. When the conspirator has played a necessary part in setting in motion a discrete course of criminal conduct, he should be held responsible, within appropriate limits, for the crimes committed as a natural and probable result of that course of conduct.
A defendant is vicariously liable for his coconspirators’ crimes if: (1) the defendant was a party to the conspiracy; (2) the crime was within the scope of the conspiracy’s unlawful aims; (3) the crime was in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that the crime was a necessary or natural consequence of the conspiracy.
Wharton’s Rule
A rule that bars a conviction for conspiracy to commit a crime that by definition can be committed only by two people acting together, such as bigamy, prostitution, or dueling.
In jurisdictions requiring an “overt act,” conspiracy requires at least one coconspirator to take an overt act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy
“At least one coconspirator”: Even a defendant who has taken no overt act is guilty of conspiracy if any one of the defendant’s coconspirators has done so.
“Overt act”: An overt act is any action taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. The action may be merely preparatory and need not itself be criminal.
The crime of attempt consists of (1) an intent to commit a particular crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent.
Sufficient “Act in Furtherance”: An act is sufficient only if it goes beyond mere preparation to commit the offense.
MPC Approach: Substantial Step. An act is sufficient if it constitutes a substantial step in the course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the crime that objectively, strongly corroborates the actor’s criminal purpose.
Examples of potential substantial steps: lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim; enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle, or enclosure where it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime.
Proximity Approach: An act is sufficient if it is sufficiently proximate to the intended completed crime; the “last step” before the crime occurs.
Factors considered: the seriousness of the potential crime, the victim’s level of fear or apprehension, the likelihood of the crime actually occurring.
Defenses to Attempt: Impossibility and Abandonment.
Legal Impossibility: Conduct where the goal of the actor is not criminal, even though they believe it to be. A defense to attempt.
Factual Impossibility: Conduct where the objective is proscribed by the criminal law, but a circumstance unknown to the actor prevents them from bringing it about. Not a defense to attempt.
Inherent Impossibility: The means chosen are totally ineffective to bring about the desired result (like voodoo). A defense to attempt.
Abandonment before sufficient act: a defendant who abandons his efforts before completing a sufficient act is not guilty of attempt as an essential element of attempt (an act in furtherance) is lacking.
Abandonment after sufficient act: It is a defense to attempt liability if the defendant abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
Insanity is a defense to criminal liability. The burden of proof of insanity is on the defendant. The result of a successful insanity defense is that the defendant is confined at a secure mental facility.
M’Naughten Test (Most used): A defendant will be found not guilty by reason of insanity if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, (1) the defendant did not know the nature or quality of the criminal act, or (2) if the defendant did know the nature and quality of the act, the defendant did not know it was wrong.
MPC Approach (ALI Test); (second most used)
4.01(1). A defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the defendant lacks substantial capacity either to (1) appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of the defendant’s conduct or (2) to conform the defendant’s conduct to the requirements of the law.
Diminished Capacity: A defendant has a defense of diminished capacity if a mental defect prevented the defendant from forming the specific intent necessary to commit an offense.
A successful diminished capacity defense results in the defendant being found “not guilty,” but the defendant may be civilly committed under some circumstances.
Incompetency: If a defendant’s mental defect causes the defendant to be unable to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, he may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced as long as that condition persists.
The defendant may be committed to a mental institution until they recover from the condition.
Prevention or Termination of a Felony: One, not necessarily a police officer, is justified in using (1) reasonable force (2) to prevent or terminate what he (3) reasonably believes to be (4) a person in the commission of a misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace or of a felony.
Deadly force may be used only in the case of a felony that presents a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.
Making An Arrest or Preventing Escape: A police officer, or a person aiding him, is justified in using (1) reasonable force (2) to make a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of one already arrested.
Deadly force only allowed by a police officer when the escapee reasonably presents a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.
One is justified in using reasonable force to protect his property from unlawful interference when they (1) reasonably believe that (2) their property is (3) in immediate danger of such unlawful interference and that (4) the use of force is necessary to avoid that danger.
Using Deadly Force: The use of deadly force is reasonable when (1) Where the unlawful interference with property is accompanied by a threat of deadly force; OR (2) (in some jurisdictions) The unlawful interference involves an invasion of an occupied dwelling house under circumstances causing the actor to reasonably believe that the invader intends to commit a felony or to do serious bodily harm to occupants therein.
Deadly Mechanical Devices: Not allowed. No deadly mantraps.
Necessity provides a defense when the defendant (1) reasonably believes that their criminal conduct (2) was necessary to avoid (3) an imminent harm to society (4) greater than the harm caused by the criminal conduct.
Reasonable Belief: Objective standard. The defendant’s subjective belief does not control.
Conduct Necessary: Necessity does not provide a defense if the harm the defendant faces is avoidable by reasonable alternative courses of action.
Not a Defense to Homicide: Some jurisdictions hold that necessity is not a defense to homicide.
Requirement of Natural Pressure: Some jurisdictions only apply necessity when the harm to be avoided is natural rather than a human threat. The MPC approach to necessity allows for manmade as well as natural threats.
Duress provides a defense to a defendant’s criminal conduct if the defendant committed the offense: (1) as a result of a person’s unlawful threat that (2) caused the defendant to reasonably believe that (3) committing the offense was necessary to avoid (4) imminent death or serious bodily injury of the defendant or another person.
Reasonable Belief: Objective standard. The defendant’s subjective belief does not control.
Conduct Necessary: Duress does not provide a defense if the harm the defendant faces is avoidable by reasonable alternative courses of action.
Not a Defense to Homicide: Some jurisdictions hold that duress is not a defense to homicide.
Requirement of Human Pressure: Duress requires a human threat rather than a natural threat.
Self-Defense: One who is not the aggressor in an encounter is justified in using reasonable force against his adversary when be reasonably believes that (1) he is in immediate danger of unlawful bodily harm from his adversary; and (2) the use of force is necessary to avoid that danger.
Under common law, an actor is permitted to use non-deadly force is self-defense if they reasonably believe that the other is about to inflict unlawful bodily harm upon them AND believes it is necessary to use such force to prevent the harm from being inflicted.
MPC 3.04(1): Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the Person. The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.
Under common law, an actor is permitted to use deadly force if they reasonably believe that the other is about to inflict death or serious bodily harm upon them AND believes it is necessary to use such force to prevent the harm from being inflicted.
The use of deadly force is not justifiable under the MPC unless the actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.
Reasonable Belief: The defendant must have an actual belief that he faces danger of harm and that belief must be reasonable in light of the defendant's circumstances.
A person who is the initial aggressor generally cannot use force in self-defense except (1) a non-deadly aggressor who is met with deadly force may justifiably defendant himself; (2) an aggressor who has withdrawn from further contact with the victim has a right of self-defense. The withdrawal must be clear and sincere.
Duty-to-Retreat Jurisdiction: Requires an actor to retreat if reasonably safe to do so before using deadly force in self defense. These jurisdictions usually recognize the Castle Doctrine--no duty to retreat in your own home or workplace unless the attacker is a cohabitant or coworker.
No-Duty-to-Retreat Jurisdiction: Do not require an actor to retreat before using deadly force.
Stand-Your-Ground Doctrine: Can be found in duty-to-retreat and no-duty-to-retreat jurisdictions. Creates a presumption that a person was justified in using deadly force if the actor used deadly force against an attack in the actor's own home.
Imperfect Self-Defense: When an actor uses deadly force, resulting in death, based on an honest but unreasonable belief that they must have used that force to defend themselves from an imminent attack, some jurisdictions reduce the grade of charge from murder to manslaughter.
General rule, an actor may not use force to defend themselves against the police, even if the police are using unlawful force on the actor. The exception, if the police are using excessive force, an actor has a right to use reasonable force to defend themselves from that excessive force. Limitations: (1) the actor cannot use greater force to protect themselves than reasonably necessary; (2) if the actor knows that the police will cease their use of excessive force upon the actor if the actor submits to arrest, they must submit to arrest.
Under the MPC, an actor is permitted to use force upon another for the protection of a third person when (1) the actor would be justified to protect himself against the injury that he believes is threatened to the third person, (2) the third person would be justified in using force against the attacker, (3) the actor believes that the intervention is necessary for the protection of the third person.
Mastering English Grammar
English grammar forms the foundation of effective communication in the language. It encompasses a set of rules and guidelines that dictate how words, phrases, and sentences are structured to convey clear and precise meanings. Understanding grammar not only enhances writing and speaking skills but also aids in interpreting complex texts accurately.
1. Parts of Speech
The building blocks of English grammar are the parts of speech: nouns, pronouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections. Each serves a unique purpose. For example, nouns name people, places, or things, while verbs express actions or states of being. Understanding the role of each part of speech is essential for constructing sentences correctly.
2. Sentence Structure
English sentences typically follow the subject-verb-object (SVO) order. For instance:
• She (subject) reads (verb) books (object).
However, variations occur in questions, exclamations, and other structures. Recognizing these patterns ensures clarity in both writing and speaking.
3. Tenses
Tenses express time and are divided into past, present, and future, with their respective simple, continuous, perfect, and perfect continuous forms. For example:
• Present simple: I write.
• Past perfect: I had written.
Mastering tenses helps in expressing events with temporal precision.
4. Agreement
Subject-verb agreement is a crucial aspect of grammar. The verb must match the subject in number and person:
• He runs every morning (singular).
• They run every morning (plural).
Similarly, pronouns must agree with their antecedents in number and gender.
5. Punctuation
Proper punctuation brings clarity and rhythm to writing. Commas, periods, colons, and semicolons organize ideas, while quotation marks, parentheses, and dashes add emphasis or extra information. Misplacing punctuation can alter meanings dramatically:
• Let’s eat, Grandma! vs. Let’s eat Grandma!
6. Active and Passive Voice
Sentences can be written in the active voice, where the subject performs the action (The dog chased the ball), or the passive voice, where the subject receives the action (The ball was chased by the dog). While active voice is often preferred for its directness, passive voice is useful for emphasizing the action or object.
7. Clauses and Phrases
Understanding the difference between independent clauses (which can stand alone) and dependent clauses (which need support) is key to constructing complex sentences. For instance:
• I stayed home because it was raining.
8. Common Challenges
English learners often struggle with irregular verbs, prepositions, and articles. Practicing these areas through reading and writing can help solidify understanding. For example:
• Irregular verb: go → went → gone.
• Prepositions: in, on, at.
• Articles: a, an, the.
9. Style and Tone
Grammar also influences tone. Formal writing often avoids contractions (do not vs. don’t) and uses complete sentences. In contrast, informal writing allows for more flexibility, including slang and fragments.
10. Continuous Learning
Grammar mastery is an ongoing process. Reading diverse materials, practicing writing, and seeking feedback are excellent ways to improve. Tools like grammar checkers and style guides can also provide valuable assistance.
By understanding and applying these principles, learners can confidently navigate the nuances of English grammar, enhancing both their personal and professional communication.
The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog
Business Concepts in the IT Industry
The IT industry thrives on innovation, efficiency, and the seamless integration of technology with business operations. Key business concepts drive this sector, enabling companies to remain competitive and adapt to rapidly evolving market demands.
1. Value Proposition
At the core of any IT business lies its value proposition: the unique products or services that meet customer needs. Companies succeed by identifying gaps in the market, such as improved cybersecurity tools, scalable cloud solutions, or efficient data analytics platforms.
2. Business Models
The IT industry employs various business models tailored to specific niches. For instance, Software as a Service (SaaS) delivers software through subscription-based cloud platforms, while Platform as a Service (PaaS) provides developers with tools to build applications. Open-source models, licensing, and freemium approaches are also common strategies to generate revenue.
3. Innovation and Disruption
Innovation is a cornerstone of IT. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT) continually disrupt traditional business operations, creating new markets and opportunities. Companies that fail to innovate risk losing their competitive edge.
4. Scalability and Agility
IT businesses prioritize scalability and agility. Products and services must adapt to fluctuating customer demands without compromising performance. Cloud computing, for example, allows businesses to scale resources on demand, ensuring cost efficiency and operational flexibility.
5. Data-Driven Decision Making
Data is a strategic asset in IT. Companies use advanced analytics to interpret user behavior, optimize operations, and forecast trends. Tools like machine learning models and business intelligence software enhance decision-making processes, providing a competitive advantage.
6. Cybersecurity and Risk Management
The growing reliance on digital infrastructure makes cybersecurity a critical business concern. IT companies invest heavily in threat detection, vulnerability assessments, and compliance with regulations like GDPR. Risk management strategies also include contingency planning for data breaches and downtime.
7. Customer-Centric Approach
In the IT industry, understanding customer needs is paramount. User experience (UX) design, personalized solutions, and 24/7 support ensure customer satisfaction. Building long-term relationships often involves continuous updates and dedicated account management.
8. Collaboration and Ecosystems
The IT sector thrives on partnerships and ecosystems. Collaborations between cloud providers, hardware manufacturers, and software developers foster innovation and efficiency. Open ecosystems allow companies to integrate third-party applications, creating value for customers.
9. Sustainability and Corporate Responsibility
With increasing awareness of environmental and social issues, IT businesses are adopting sustainable practices. Initiatives include reducing energy consumption in data centers, recycling electronic waste, and promoting diversity within the workforce.
10. Globalization and Localization
As IT companies expand globally, they must balance standardization with localization. This involves adapting products to different languages, cultural preferences, and regulatory environments while maintaining consistent quality and branding.
By mastering these business concepts, IT companies can navigate the dynamic landscape of technology and remain at the forefront of innovation and customer satisfaction.
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The appellant was tried on a count charging murder. The case for the Crown was that he poured paraffin through the letterbox of a house and on to its front door and set it alight. The house caught fire and a child died. The appellant confessed that he had started the fire but added that he did not want anyone to die. His defence was denial of either starting the fire or making any such admission. The direction to the Jury equated foresight with intention and the appellant was convicted.
On appeal against conviction on the question of the intent necessary to establish a charge of murder:—
Held, allowing the appeal, that in the light of authorities published subsequent to the direction it was clearly wrong; that, accordingly, the conviction would be quashed and that, in the circumstances, the court would substitute a verdict of manslaughter and impose a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment
Per curiam . On a charge of murder, where the accused has done a manifestly dangerous act and someone has died as a result, the Jury should be directed that a person may intend to achieve a certain result while not desiring it to come about; in determining whether the accused had the necessary intent, the Jury may find it helpful to ask themselves, first, how probable was the consequence which resulted from his voluntary act and, secondly, whether he foresaw that consequence; he could not have intended to bring death or serious harm about if he did not appreciate that death or serious harm was likely to result from his act; if he thought that the risk to which he was exposing the deceased was only slight, the Jury may easily conclude that he did not intend to bring about the death; the Jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the actions of the accused and that he appreciated that that was the case
APPEAL against conviction.
The appellant, Ransford Delroy Nedrick, was tried in the Crown Court at Stafford before Otton J. and a Jury on an indictment containing three counts. Count 1 charged murder, in that, on 15 July 1984 he murdered Lloyd Foreshaw, aged 12; count 2 charged arson with intent to endanger lives; and count 3 charged arson being reckless as to lives being endangered. On 25 January 1985 he was convicted of murder by a majority of 10 to 2. The Jury were discharged from returning a verdict on count 2 and count 3. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
He appealed against conviction on the ground that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory in that, inter alia, the judge misdirected the Jury on the intent necessary to establish a charge of murder. At the conclusion of the hearing Lord Lane C.J. announced that the appeal was allowed, a verdict of manslaughter was substituted and a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment was imposed for reasons which would be given later.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
Representation
Lord Hooson Q.C. and David Guishard (assigned by the Registrar of Criminal Appeals) for the appellant.
J. S. Coward Q.C. and Brian Leech for the Crown.
Cur. adv. vult.
LORD LANE C.J.
10 July 1986. LORD LANE C.J. read the following judgment of the court. On 25 January 1985 in the Crown Court at Stafford the appellant, Ransford Delroy Nedrick, was convicted by a majority verdict of murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Jury were discharged from returning verdicts on two further counts, one of arson with intent to endanger life and the other of arson being reckless as to life being endangered.
On 20 May 1986, having declined to apply the proviso, we substituted for the verdict of murder a verdict of guilty of manslaughter and passed therefor a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment under the provisions of section 3 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 . We now give our reasons.
The case for the Crown was that the appellant had a grudge against a woman called Viola Foreshaw, as a result of which, after threats that he would “burn her out,” he went to her house in the early hours of 15 July 1984, poured paraffin through the letter-box and on to the front door and set it alight. He gave no warning. The house was burnt down and one of Viola Foreshaw’s children, a boy aged 12 called Lloyd, died of asphyxiation and burns.
After a number of interviews during which he denied any responsibility, the appellant eventually confessed to the police that he had started the fire in the manner described, adding, “I didn’t want anyone to die, I am not a murderer; please tell the judge; God knows I am not a murderer.” When asked why he did it, he replied, “Just to wake her up and frighten her.”
The appellant’s defence, rejected by the Jury, was that he had neither started the fire nor made any admissions to that effect.
The sole effective ground of appeal is that the judge misdirected the Jury on the intent necessary to establish a charge of murder. This is the direction which he gave:
“It is not necessary to prove an intention to kill; the Crown’s case is made out if they prove an intention to cause serious injury — *1027 that is sufficient … There is, however, an alternative state of mind which You will have to consider. If when the accused performed the act of setting fire to the house, he knew that it was highly probable that the act would result in serious bodily injury to somebody inside the house, even though he did not desire it — desire to bring that result about — he is guilty of murder. If You are sure that he did the unlawful and deliberate act, and, if You are sure that that was his state of mind, then, again, the prosecution’s case in the alternative of murder would be established.”
That direction was given before the publication of the speeches in the House of Lords in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 and Reg. v. Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 . In the light of those speeches it was plainly wrong. The direction was based on a passage in Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence & Practice , 41st ed. (1982), p. 994, paragraph 17–13, which has been repeated in the 42nd ed. (1985), p. 1162, paragraph 17–13. That passage was expressly disapproved in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 917 et seq., in that it equates foresight with intention, whereas “foresight of consequences, as an element bearing on the issue of intention in murder … belongs, not to the substantive law, but to the law of evidence,” per Lord Bridge of Harwich, at p. 928. The judge was in no way to blame of course for having directed the jury in this way.
What then does a jury have to decide so far as the mental element in murder is concerned? It simply has to decide whether the defendant intended to kill or do serious bodily harm. In order to reach that decision the Jury must pay regard to all the relevant circumstances, including what the defendant himself said and did.
In the great majority of cases a direction to that effect will be enough, particularly where the defendant’s actions amounted to a direct attack upon his victim, because in such cases the evidence relating to the defendant’s desire or motive will be clear and his intent will have been the same as his desire or motive. But in some cases, of which this is one, the defendant does an act which is manifestly dangerous and as a result someone dies. The primary desire or motive of the defendant may not have been to harm that person, or indeed anyone. In that situation what further directions should a Jury be given as to the mental state which they must find to exist in the defendant if murder is to be proved?
We have endeavoured to crystallise the effect of their Lordships’ speeches in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 and Reg. v. Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 in a way which we hope may be helpful to judges who have to handle this type of case.
It may be advisable first of all to explain to the Jury that a man may intend to achieve a certain result whilst at the same time not desiring it to come about. In Reg. v. Moloney Lord Bridge gave an illustration of the distinction, at p. 926:
“A man who, at London Airport, boards a plane which he knows to be bound for Manchester, clearly intends to travel to Manchester, even though Manchester is the last place he wants to be and his motive for boarding the plane is simply to escape pursuit.”
The man who knowingly boards the Manchester aircraft wants to go there in the sense that boarding it is a voluntary act. His desire to leave London predominates over his desire not to go to Manchester. When he *1028 decides to board the aircraft, if not before, he forms the intention to travel to Manchester.
In Reg. v. Hancock [1986] A.C. 455 the House decided that the Reg. v. Moloney guidelines require a reference to probability. Lord Scarman said, at p. 473:
“They also require an explanation that the greater the probability of a consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that if that consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was also intended.”
When determining whether the defendant had the necessary intent, it may therefore be helpful for a Jury to ask themselves two questions. (1) How probable was the consequence which resulted from the defendant’s voluntary act? (2) Did he foresee that consequence?
If he did not appreciate that death or serious harm was likely to result from his act, he cannot have intended to bring it about. If he did, but thought that the risk to which he was exposing the person killed was only slight, then it may be easy for the Jury to conclude that he did not intend to bring about that result. On the other hand, if the Jury are satisfied that at the material time the defendant recognised that death or serious harm would be virtually certain (barring some unforeseen intervention) to result from his voluntary act, then that is a fact from which they may find it easy to infer that he intended to kill or do serious bodily harm, even though he may not have had any desire to achieve that result.
As Lord Bridge of Harwich said in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 925: “the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must be little short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent.” At p. 926 he uses the expression “moral certainty”; he said, at p. 929 “will lead to a certain consequence unless something unexpected supervenes to prevent it.”
Where the charge is murder and in the rare cases where the simple direction is not enough, the Jury should be directed that they are not entitled to infer the necessary intention, unless they feel sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty (barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the defendant appreciated that such was the case.
Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes inevitable that his actions will result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he intended that result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen. The decision is one for the Jury to be reached upon a consideration of all the evidence.
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carriage
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councillor
counsellor
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diarrhoea
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efflorescence
embezzlement
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frenetically
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illiterate
immaculate
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jewellery
legionnaire
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massacre
merriment
millionaire
narcissism
occasion
omelette
palliative
personnel
questionnaire
remittance
renaissance
saccharine
scintillating
shrubbery
silhouette
stilettos
supercilious
surreptitious
surveillance
curtsy
deliquescence
dinosaur
disenfranchised
dredge
dysentery
echelon
ecstasy
ecumenical
eczema
eerie
endeavour
epiphany
exemplary
exhilarate
facsimile
fluorescent
gaiety
gratuitous
gynaecology
haematite
haemoglobin
humanitarianism
idiosyncrasy
kindergarten
kleptomaniac
labyrinth
lacquer
laparoscopy
lascivious
liaison
liquefier
luminescent
maintenance
manoeuvre
migraine
milieu
misdemeanour
moustache
neighbour
orthopaedic
panache
pariah
perseverance
relieve
retrieve
siege
sieve
variety
yield
accessory
accessibility
accommodate
appalling
assassination
assessment
balloon
cassette
commissioner
commissariat
committee
connoisseur
halloween
guerrilla
millennium
possession
reconnaissance
tennessee
woollen
acceleration
acclaim
accredited
accumulate
ambassador
annihilate
annunciation
appearance
appropriation
arraign
assiduous
battalion
bellwether
bizarre
blizzard
swivelling
tranquillize
trousseau
utterance
vacuum
vicissitude
villain
acquaintance
acquisition
adrenaline
aesthetic
alacritous
analysable
aneurysm
aqueous
archaeology
ascension
autumn
avalanche
benevolent
bereave
blithesome
bouquet
boutique
brochure
buoyancy
bureaucracy
camaraderie
clairvoyant
coadunation
coalescence
coalition
coercion
colonel
complaisance
conglomerate
contemptuous
conveyance
courtesy
couture
pestilential
pharaoh
phlegmatic
plateau
playwright
pneumonia
portuguese
prerequisite
privilege
pseudonym
psychiatrist
psychology
quadruple
raucous
recede
refrigerator
rehearsal
reminiscence
rendezvous
rhapsody
sanctuaries
schizophrenia
secretary
souvenir
sovereignty
squawked
subservient
supersede
therapeutic
traceable
traipse
tumultuous
twelfth
ubiquitous
verisimilitude
veterinary
whimsical
xenophobia
